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This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research, which converges on the idea
that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although
some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for
instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the
self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. Implications for
understanding the self in various areas of psychological research—e.g., neuroimaging, autism, amnesia, Alzheimer’s
disease, and mirror self-recognition—are discussed in brief.
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What is the self?
The phenomenology is compelling. Each of us has
the experience of a unitary self, an “I” that remem-
bers, chooses, thinks, plans, and feels. Yet it has been
notoriously difficult to provide an account of just
what this thinking, feeling, remembering, planning
entity is. As Gordon Allport1 famously noted:
“Who is the I that knows the bodily me, who has
an image of myself and a sense of identity over
time, who knows that I have propriate strivings?
I know all these things, and what is more, I know
that I know them. But who is it who has this
perspectival grasp?. . . It is much easier to feel
the self than to define the self.”
Bertrand Russell’s2,3 distinction between knowl-
edge by acquaintance and knowledge by description
may be relevant to the difficulties that troubled All-
port. According to Russell we have knowledge by
acquaintance when we know something via di-
rect personal contact (sensory or introspective) and
manifest that knowledge by using terms referring to
that knowledge to communicate with others. With
respect to the self, this is seen in the ease with which
we talk about the self as well as understand talk
about self by others.
Problems quickly arise, however, when we try to
pin down what it is we refer to by the word “self”—
when we are asked to describe what the word “self”
means. Despite centuries of thought devoted to the
problem, it has proven notoriously difficult to pro-
vide a set of propositions capable of transforming
our acquired knowledge into a satisfying description
of what a self is.4–15
The self, of course, is not alone in this regard. Sim-
ilar issues arise, for example, with the word “time”:
“What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I
wish to explain it to one that asked, I know not. . .”16
This hardly is surprising, because the concepts of
self and time are intimately related.17–19 Questions
pertaining to the ontology of self, for example, in-
clude problems of synchronicity—i.e., what is it
that accounts for the apparent phenomenal unity
of self at a single moment—and diachronicity—i.e.,
the perceived continuity of self over time. Similarly,
the notion of personal identity embodies the belief
that the self, as presently experienced, is continu-
ous with the self I experienced in the past and the
self I will experience in the future.20 These, and
a host of related, contentious, issues surrounding
the word “self” make it clear that describing what
we are talking about when we use the word “self”
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is a task for which insufficient progress has been
made.21–24
When psychologists use the term “self,” we thus
often lack a clear conception of what the term is
attempting to pick out—we have knowledge by ac-
quaintance, but our knowledge by description is sel-
dom up to the task. This is particularly problematic
because the number of research papers devoted to
self-related processes is proliferating at a staggering
pace. For example, in the most recent issue of the
journal Self and Identity (2009, Volume 8, jointly
published as Issues 2 and 3) we identified from
the table of contents the following potpourri of self
topics: self-processes, self-control, self-verification,
self-authorship, self-enhancement, self-esteem, self-
regulation, self-improvement, self-protection, self-
image, self-threat, and self-stereotypes.
But what exactly is “the self” that serves as the
object of this diverse set of predicates: What is be-
ing verified, authored, threatened, regulated? On the
comparatively few occasions on which it has been
attempted,25–27 psychologists have found it extraor-
dinarily difficult to provide a convincing and co-
herent descriptive account of the self. Indeed, inves-
tigators often sidestep these difficulties, relying on
their readers’ familiarity with the term “self,” de-
rived from years of knowledge by acquaintance, to
confer a sense of confidence that he or she knows to
what it is the author refers.
A different view of the problem of “the self”
One difficulty in describing the “self” is that there
may not be a single thing to be described. Rather,
recent research suggests that the self is a multiplicity
of related, yet separable, processes and contents.28,29
As Klein and colleagues30 have argued, instead of
looking for a unitary entity we can describe as “the
self,” we should be breaking the problem into parts,
studying aspects of the self separately before asking
how they interact with one another to create the
phenomenal appearance of unity.
Contributions from neuropsychology
Given the automatic and flawless way in which
different cognitive systems normally interact, it is
difficult to disentangle their respective contribu-
tions to knowledge about the self. However, be-
cause neuropsychological disorders can be quite
selective—patients exhibit normal or near normal
performance in some domains and profound im-
pairments in others18,31—they can provide a win-
dow into the operation of a component system in
relative isolation, without the influence of other sys-
tems. By revealing differential patterns of impaired
and preserved performance, the study of patients
with neuropsychological impairments can illumi-
nate aspects of a system’s function and structure
that are difficult to detect under normal operating
conditions.32,33
Applied to the self, recent neuropsychological
studies suggest that the seemingly unitary self of
everyday experience may be composed of several
different, functionally isolable (though normally in-
teracting) systems.28,29,34,35 These include, but are
not limited to:
1. Episodic memories of one’s life events.18,36–38
2. Semantic summary representations of one’s
personality traits.39–42
3. Semantic knowledge of facts about one’s
life.18,42,43
4. An experience of continuity through time:
The “I” experienced now is connected to the
“I” experienced at previous points (as well as
later points) in one’s life. Episodic memory is
known to contribute heavily to this ability.44,45
5. A sense of personal agency and ownership: The
belief—or experience—that “I” (agency) am
the cause of “my own” (ownership) thoughts
and actions.46,47
6. The ability to self-reflect: To form metarep-
resentations where the agent is the self, and
make inferences on the basis of those repre-
sentations.46,48,49
7. The physical self: The ability to represent and
recognize (e.g., in mirrors, photographs) one’s
body.41,50,51
The self and memory
Overview
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on
points 1, 2, and 3 above—the roles of episodic
and semantic memory in knowledge of one’s self.
First, we review evidence from case studies of
patients suffering neurological disorders (e.g., am-
nesia, Alzhiemer’s dementia, and autism) that
demonstrate that episodic and semantic memory
both contribute to our sense of self, although their
relation is one of functional independence (i.e.,
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although under normal circumstances they interact,
one self-memory system can operate independently
of the other32). We then draw on these results to help
interpret findings from studies of self in the cogni-
tive, clinical, and social literatures. Our goal is to
discover which, if any, of our generalizations about
the fractionation of self-memory systems might help
us better understand the concept of self as it is used
in psychological research.
Prior to presenting our Neurological casework,
it is important to address the question of whether
these participants, despite experiencing episodic
amnesia, were able to access memory for lived events
(albeit unconsciously), which could implicitly have
influenced their semantic judgments. Because this
concern was voiced by some of the reviewers it mer-
its discussion.
We have two responses. First, in terms of def-
initions, episodic memory is held to be the con-
scious recollection of past personal events.34,52
Accordingly, the notion of unconscious episodic in-
fluence on semantic judgments is clearly at odds
with the meaning of the term “episodic memory” as
currently used in the literature.
However, one could reasonably adopt the posi-
tion that exemplars,53 though not consciously avail-
able for verbal report, nonetheless are active at a
subconscious level when a semantic decision is re-
quested. Aware of this concern, my colleagues and
I36,54 have devoted a substantial amount of our re-
search (consisting in multiple methods—for exam-
ple, priming techniques, transfer appropriate pro-
cessing, the method of reversed association39,55 to
show that exemplar-based self-knowledge is not ac-
tivated (consciously or unconsciously) when par-
ticipants perform semantic judgments about the
self.29,35
Case studies neurological patients
Approximately 15 years ago, Klein and Loftus36 pro-
posed that the study of patients suffering amnesia
might provide a particularly effective method for
examining the respective contributions of episodic
and semantic memory to self-knowledge. This is be-
cause amnesic patients often experience highly se-
lective memory loss, typically displaying intact se-
mantic memory with impaired access to episodic
memory.32 Amnesic patients therefore present a
unique opportunity to test alternative models of
self-knowledge: tests of trait knowledge can be con-
ducted in amnesic patients with assurance that
episodic memory for traits is not involved.
If semantic memory contains a database of per-
sonality trait summaries (see point 2), then an am-
nesic patient should be able to know what he or she
is like despite being unable to episodically recollect
the particular experiences from which that knowl-
edge was derived. There now is neuropsychological
data from five patients: W.J., K.C., D.B., R.J., and
K.R, that speak directly to this and other issues in-
volving how types of knowledge about oneself are
acquired and represented in memory.
W.J.: W.J. suffered a concussive blow to the head
shortly after completing her first quarter in college.37
Interviews conducted shortly after her accident re-
vealed that W.J. had forgotten much of what had
happened during the preceding 12 months—a pe-
riod of time that included her first quarter at college.
To document her deficit in episodic memory, Klein
and colleagues37 used the autobiographical memory
cueing task originated by Galton56 and subsequently
popularized by Crovitz and Schiffman.57 W.J. was
asked to try to recall specific personal events related
to cue words and to provide for each recollection as
precise a date as possible. Initial testing revealed that
she was unable to recollect personal events from the
past year. Over the next month, however, her am-
nesia remitted, and when retested four weeks later,
her performance had improved to the point that
it was indistinguishable from that of neurologically
healthy women who served as controls.
On two occasions—during her amnesia and after
its resolution—W.J. was asked to provide person-
ality ratings describing what she was like during
her first quarter at college. While she was amnesic,
W.J. was able to describe her personality; more im-
portantly, the ratings she made during her amnesic
period agreed with those she made afterward, as well
as with independent raters who knew her at college.
Thus, while W.J. was amnesic she knew what she
had been like in college, despite the fact that she
could not episodically recollect any personal events
or experiences from that time period.
Could W.J.’s judgments while amnesic be based
on her continued access to episodic recollections
of high school or earlier—periods not covered by
her amnesia? This seems unlikely. W.J., like many
freshmen, manifested reliably different personal-
ity traits in college than she did in high school.
This is not surprising given the new-found personal
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independence associated with the individual’s
abrupt change from his or her role(s) in family
life to the freedom of college life. Yet W.J.’s self-
ratings during the amnesic period reflected her col-
lege personality to a reliably greater extent than they
did her precollege personality.37 This suggests that
W.J.’s ratings were based on semantic knowledge of
her personality during her time at college, not on
recollections of episodes long past.
K.C.: Although the case of W.J. supports the in-
dependence of semantic trait self-knowledge from
episodic recollection, it might be argued that a par-
tial overlap between her episodic knowledge of her
precollege self may have enabled her to provide
a reliable and accurate account of her trait self-
knowledge during her amnesic episode. Such an
account, however, fails to provide a viable expla-
nation of the pattern of intact trait self-knowledge
manifested by our next patient, K.C.
Patient K.C. permanently lost his entire fund
of episodic memory following a motorcycle acci-
dent.42,45 He also underwent a marked personality
change following the accident. Nevertheless, K.C.
was able to describe his postmorbid personality with
considerable accuracy (his mother’s ratings served
as the criterion42). The fact that K.C. could accu-
rately report his own personality traits supports the
view that knowing oneself does not require retrieval
of episodic memories. It is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that personality information is stored in-
dependently from episodic memory, in the form of
semantic trait summaries.
It is important to note that K.C.’s self-knowledge
reflected his postmorbid personality, not his pre-
morbid personality. This means that K.C. not only
had access to semantic knowledge of his own per-
sonality traits, but he was also able to acquire new
knowledge about his personality. Yet this updating
occurred without his being able to episodically rec-
ollect any information about the behavioral events
on which this updating presumably was based.
D.B.: The case of D.B. (like that of K.C.) shows
that one can have accurate knowledge of one’s own
personality traits even with a total loss of episodic
memory. Patient D.B. was a 79-year-old man who
became profoundly amnesic as a result of anoxia
following cardiac arrest.18 Both informal question-
ing and psychological testing revealed that D.B. was
unable to recollect a single thing he had ever done or
experienced from any period of his life. In addition
to his dense retrograde episodic amnesia, he also
suffered severe anterograde episodic memory im-
pairment, rendering him incapable of recollecting
events that transpired only minutes earlier.
To test D.B.’s semantic self-knowledge, we asked
him on two occasions (separated by several weeks)
to judge a list of personality traits for self-
descriptiveness. We also asked D.B.’s daughter (with
whom he lives) to rate D.B. on the same traits. Our
findings revealed that D.B.’s ratings were both reli-
able (r = 0.69 across sessions) and consistent with
the way he is perceived by others (r = 0.64 be-
tween D.B. and his daughter). (Age-matched con-
trols showed rs = 0.74 and 0.57 across sessions and
raters, respectively). D.B. thus appears to have accu-
rate and detailed knowledge about his personality
despite the fact that he has no known conscious ac-
cess to any specific actions or experiences on which
that knowledge was based.34,42,58–60
Thus, like W.J. and K.C., D.B. manifests a clear
dissociation between episodic and semantic self-
knowledge. But can semantic knowledge of one’s
own personality traits dissociate from other types
of semantic knowledge? Further testing of D.B. sug-
gests that it can.
D.B.’s semantic memory also was affected by his
illness, although this impairment was far less severe
than that affecting his episodic memory.18 For ex-
ample, although he knew a variety of general facts
about his life, he showed a number of striking gaps
in his life story. He knew the name of the high school
he attended and where he was born, but could not
recall the names of any friends from his childhood or
the year of his birth. He also showed spotty knowl-
edge of facts in the public domain. For example,
although he was able to accurately recount a num-
ber of details about certain historical events (e.g., the
Civil War), his knowledge of other historical facts
was seriously compromised (e.g., he claimed that
America was discovered by the British in 1812). De-
spite these impairments in D.B.’s semantic knowl-
edge of his own personality was intact. This result
suggests a dissociation within semantic memory—
between general semantic knowledge and semantic
knowledge of one’s personality traits.
Additional testing revealed a dissociation be-
tween D.B.’s knowledge of his own personality traits
and the traits of others. For example, D.B. could
not retrieve accurate knowledge of his daughter’s
personaity traits. The correlation between D.B.’s
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ratings of his daughter and her self-ratings was not
reliable (r = 0.23), and was less than half that found
between control parents’ ratings of their child and
the child’s self-ratings (r = 0.61). Thus, although
D.B.’s ability to retrieve accurate knowledge of his
own personality was intact—i.e., it was no different
from that of age-matched controls—he had lost the
ability to retrieve accurate personality information
about his adult daughter.
In short, D.B.’s case goes beyond the
episodic/semantic distinction, suggesting category-
specific dissociations within semantic memory.61
His ability to retrieve trait self-knowledge is in-
tact; his ability to retrieve his daughter’s traits is
impaired; and his knowledge about the world at
large (and specific facts about himself) is impaired.
This pattern raises the possibility that the human
cognitive architecture includes a subsystem of se-
mantic memory that is functionally specialized for
the storage and retrieval of trait self-knowledge. Ad-
ditional data relevant to this claim comes from the
case of K.R.
K.R.: K.R., a patient diagnosed with late-stage
Alzheimer’s dementia, shows that reliable, accurate
knowledge of one’s own personality can exist with-
out the ability to update that knowledge.40,51
K.R.’s performance on standard tests of cognitive
functioning (e.g., the Mini-Mental State Examina-
tion) indicated she suffers from late-stage dementia.
She was disoriented for time and place and experi-
enced difficulties with word finding and object nam-
ing. Her anterograde memory function was severely
impaired, leaving her unable to recall events she had
in mind only moments before. Knowledge of her
personal past was sketchy. For example, she some-
times believed her late husband was alive, and her
estimates of how long she has lived in her current
facility ranged from 2 months to 14 years.
Despite these profound deficits, K.R. had reliable
knowledge of her own personality traits. We asked
her on two separate occasions to judge a list of per-
sonality traits for self-descriptiveness. We also asked
K.R.’s daughter and her caregiver at the assisted liv-
ing facility to rate K.R. on the same traits. The results
showed that K.R.’s test-retest ratings were reliable
(r = 0.86). However, her ratings did not agree with
the ratings provided by either her daughter or her
caregiver (rs = 0.31, −0.11, for daughter and care-
giver, respectively). This lack of consistency was not
because the daughter and caregiver were poor judges
of character; when asked to rate other individuals,
their judgments correlated strongly with those of
others.
How can K.R.’s ratings be so reliable, yet agree so
little with those who know her best? According to her
family, K.R.’s personality and behavior have changed
dramatically as the disease progressed, but she seems
unaware of her transformation (a situation fairly
common among patients suffering Alzheimer’s de-
mentia).62,63 This suggests the possibility that the
disease may have impaired K.R.’s ability to update
the semantic records that store information about
her personality. If her self-knowledge is intact but
not being updated, then K.R.’s ratings may reflect
her premorbid personality rather than her current
one.
To test this hypothesis, we asked K.R.’s daugh-
ter to rate her mother on the same list of traits,
only this time she was asked to base her ratings on
her mother’s personality prior to the onset of the
disease. These ratings were strongly correlated with
those provided by K.R. herself (r = 0.59). So were
preonset trait ratings of K.R. provided by her son-
in-law (r = 0.79). Taken together, these findings
indicate that K.R.’s ratings are accurate, but reflect
her pre-Alzheimer’s personality.
K.R. also knows her daughter’s personality traits.
When asked to rate her daughter on the same list
of traits, her ratings correlated strongly with her
daughter’s self-ratings (r = 0.65). This is expected
if K.R.’s fund of personality knowledge was created
premorbidly, and remains intact. But if, as hypothe-
sized, K.R. has lost the ability to update her semantic
personality files, then her ratings should be inaccu-
rate for people whom she first met after the onset of
her dementia.
This was the case. On two occasions (weeks
apart), K.R. was asked to rate her caregiver, whom
she had been with for 2.5 years. K.R.’s test-retest re-
liability was low (r = 0.34), in striking contrast to
the reliablity of her self-ratings (r = 0.86). More-
over, K.R.’s ratings of the caregiver did not overlap
reliably with the caregiver’s ratings of his own per-
sonality (r = 0.18). This is not due to the caregiver
having a skewed view of himself. His self-ratings
were strongly correlated with those provided by two
age-matched, neurological healthy, women living in
the same facility, who had known the caregiver for
about the same length of time (rs = 0.73, 0.68).
This also shows that K.R.’s inability to acquire new
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personality information is not a simple manifes-
tation of the normal aging process. Clearly, the
neurologically healthy age-matched controls were
quite capable of acquiring accurate knowledge
of the personality of someone they had recently
met.
Thus, despite profound cognitive deficits, K.R.
has intact knowledge of her own premorbid per-
sonality and that of her daughter. That her trait
knowledge has been preserved and remains retriev-
able are remarkable given the difficulties she has re-
trieving ordinary facts from semantic memory: e.g.,
the names of everyday objects, what a clock looks
like, where she is. Like the case of D.B., K.R.’s pre-
served self-knowledge suggests a dissociationwithin
semantic memory, suggesting the presence of a func-
tionally specialized database for the storage and re-
trieval of information about her personality.
It would appear, however, that the computa-
tional machinery responsible for updating person-
ality knowledge (intact in K.C.) has been impaired
in K.R. by the Alzheimer’s disease. K.R. does not
know her own current, postmorbid personality, nor
has she been able to learn the personality traits of
her primary caregiver.
R.J.: Patients K.C., W.J., and D.B. lost access to
episodic memory as a result of brain trauma. How-
ever, there also are individuals for whom episodic
memory fails to develop in the first place.64,65 Such
developmental dissociations are particularly inter-
esting because they permit inferences about the ori-
gins of self-knowledge that are not licensed by the
discovery of dissociations caused by brain trauma
and disease in adults.
Consider, for example, the hypothesis that se-
mantic self-knowledge, despite being functionally
independent of episodic memory, is initially con-
structed from a database of episodic memories. This
hypothesis cannot be ruled out by cases like D.B.,
K.R., and W.J. Their intact semantic self-knowledge
could have been derived from episodic memories
acquired during the years prior to the brain trauma
that caused their episodic loss as adults. But con-
sider the implications of finding an individual who
never has developed the ability to access episodic
memories, yet has intact semantic self-knowledge.
This developmental dissociation would suggest that
building a semantic database of trait self-knowledge
does not require access to a database of episodic
memories.
Autism is a developmental disorder which has
been hypothesized to impair the cognitive machin-
ery that supports metarepresentations from de-
veloping normally.66,67 It has been proposed that
episodic memories are stored in and retrieved via
metarepresentations.68 If so, then autism should dis-
rupt the normal development of episodic memory.
To test this prediction, Klein, Chan, & Loftus69 as-
sessed the episodic memory of R.J., a 21-year-old
male with diagnosed with autism.
Compared with ability matched controls, R.J. was
found to be severely impaired on a variety of tests of
recall, especially when memory for personally expe-
rienced events was tested (e.g., the Galton-Crovitz
task56,57). Although his impairment was develop-
mental in origin, his episodic performance was sim-
ilar to that found in cases of amnesia caused by brain
trauma.70
Despite his deficit in episodic retrieval, R.J.
demonstrated reliable and accurate knowledge of his
personality traits. His test-retest correlations were
high (r = 0.86; I.Q. matched controls, r = 0.78).
Moreover, the correlation between R.J.’s trait self-
ratings and his mother’s ratings of him was signifi-
cant (r = 0.56) and did not differ reliably from that
obtained from control mother–son pairs (r = 0.50).
R.J.’s self-ratings also were compared with ratings of
R.J. obtained from one of his teachers; the correla-
tion again was reliable (r = 0.49) and comparable to
those obtained between control mother–son pairs.
These findings suggest that R.J.’s knowledge of
what he is like accurately reflects how he is perceived
by people with whom he interacts.71 But how did he
acquire this trait self-knowledge? His case suggests
that access to a database of episodic memories is not
necessary. R.J. cannot retrieve episodic memories
now and, because his impairment is developmental
in origin, he probably never developed this abil-
ity in the first place. All four previously described
cases—W.J., D.B., K.C., and R.J.—show that trait
self-knowledge can exist independently of episodic
access; but R.J.’s developmental dissociation sug-
gests that the acquisition of trait self-knowledge does
not require episodic access (the same can be inferred
for K.C.’s ability to update his knowledge of his per-
sonality).
As in the cases of K.R. and D.B., further tests of
R.J. suggest content-specific dissociations within se-
mantic memory. Klein and colleagues72 asked R.J. to
judge features of common objects (e.g., Is a lemon
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sour? Is a balloon round?). R.J.’s answers were reli-
able across sessions (r = 0.77). However, they did
not correlate with those provided by others of the
same mental age. There was high agreement among
I.Q. matched controls, with correlations among
their answers ranging from 0.78 to 0.81. In con-
trast, correlations between R.J.’s answers and theirs
ranged from 0.18 to 0.33.
R.J.’s atypical semantic knowledge is not due
to a general inability to understand or answer
questions—his ability to answer questions is fine,
and when he is unsure what a term means, he re-
quests clarification. This pattern—consensually ac-
curate personality knowledge coexisting with odd,
nonconsensual knowledge of foods, animals, and
objects—is thus surprising. One would think the
evidence of one’s senses would allow the easy acqui-
sition of knowledge about tastes, shapes, and colors.
Indeed, words like sweet, tall, and large are more
concrete and have more obvious referents than per-
sonality terms such as kind, friendly, and ungrateful.
Nevertheless, an individual with autism was able to
learn his own personality traits, but was unable to
acquire consensually held knowledge of foods, ani-
mals, and objects.
It has been proposed that culturally shared knowl-
edge results when domain-specific inference systems
interact with linguistically transmitted information
which the hearer stores—at least temporarily—in
metarepresentations.73 Deciding which part of the
message is relevant requires one to make inferences
about the speaker’s background beliefs and commu-
nicative intent—which also depends on metarep-
resentations.73 This proposal could explain why a
person with autism—whose ability to form
metarepresentations is likely limited—would have
difficulty figuring out which knowledge is shared
by those around him. Lacking normal metarepre-
sentational abilities, R.J. would have difficulty infer-
ring a speaker’s beliefs and communicative intent.66
Without being able to store people’s utterances in
metarepresentations, apart from semantic memory,
he would take everything said to him at face value.
Other people’s false beliefs, lies, ironic remarks, and
metaphors would be stored in semantic memory
as if they were true. Eventually this could have the
effect of partially corrupting his database of world
knowledge.67
More recently Klein and colleagues74 found that
R.J. fails to accurately differentiate between the per-
sonalities of his various family members, and that
his ratings of them are less nuanced and less situa-
tionally specific than his ratings of his own person-
ality. Specifically, despite the finding that R.J. has
reliable and valid knowledge of his own personality
traits,69 his ratings of other people (e.g., mother, fa-
ther, brother) fail to accurately distinguish between
their quite different personalities. Rather, he views
them all as essentially the same (range of correla-
tions = 0.75 to 0.89)—in fact, R.J. gave his mother,
father, and brother identical personality ratings on
almost two-thirds of the traits he rated. This is not
because his family members all share the same per-
sonality profiles. The correlations they provide for
each other clearly indicate that they see themselves
as reliably different (range: rs = 0.41–0.46).
Moreover, it is not the case that R.J.’s ratings of
his parents correlate highly because they present a
uniform personality when interacting with him—
R.J. also sees his brother as very similar to his parents
(r=0.87 for his ratings of brother and father and r=
0.75 for his ratings of brother and mother). Nor is
R.J.’s failure to distinguish among family members
a side effect of his mental age. T.M., a cognitively
normal male of approximately the same mental age
as R.J., distinguishes between his parents (r = 0.47),
yet R.J. does not. Evidence presented in the case
study also reveals that R.J.’s high correlations among
family members was not due to a tendency to assign
a socially desirable rating to everyone.74
Interestingly, R.J. was far more likely to assign ex-
treme trait ratings—“definitely” or “not at all” to
family members than were appropriately matched
control raters. Yet, his response repertoire is not
restricted to the use of extreme categories. In rat-
ing his ratings of his own personality traits, R.J.,
often uses the intermediate category “somewhat.”
Indeed, in this respect his self-ratings did not differ
reliably from self-ratings of cognitively normal con-
trols. Moreover, R.J. used the category “somewhat”
far more often in rating himself than in his ratings
of others.
A “somewhat” generous (or kind or lazy) per-
son may be someone who is moderately generous
(or kind or lazy) in every situation. However, given
that most human behavior shows considerable sen-
sitivity to context, a more likely explanation is that
“somewhat” reflects the perception that the indi-
vidual being rated is (say) generous in some situa-
tions but not in others. On this view, R.J.’s use of
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“somewhat” indexes the extent to which he perceives
an individual’s behavior as varying across situations.
If this line of inference is correct, then R.J. under-
stands that his own behavior varies with the situa-
tion, but he fails to see the same is true (at least to
the same degree) with respect to other persons.
This interpretation fits well with what is known
about autism and theory of mind. As a result of this
developmental disorder, it is hypothesized that the
computational machinery that supports metarep-
resentation67 is impaired. As a consequence, people
with autism have difficulty inferring other peoples’
mental states, especially what others think, believe
and know (i.e., the epistemic mental states). Our
findings suggest that a person with autism can act
on his own knowledge, whether he is meta-aware
of that knowledge or not. As a result, R.J. can be
aware of the ways in which his behavior varies as
a function of context (at least as he construes it).
However, his inability to correctly infer what other
people believe, think, and know may be a barrier
to his understanding how others construe their sit-
uations. To see the situational contingencies in the
behaviors of his mother, father, and brother, R.J.
would have to be able to infer what each of them
thinks is happening in the situations in which they
find themselves, even when what they think differs
from what R.J. thinks. Yet many autistic individuals
are notoriously poor at such “false belief” tasks.75
Summing up
The neuropsychological cases presented permit us
to draw some tentative conclusions about how the
cognitive architecture learns the personality traits of
the individual in which it is situated.
1. Learning personality traits does not require ac-
cess to episodic memories. K.C. learned about
his postmorbid personality despite having no
ability to retrieve episodic memories. R.J. also
knows his personality traits, yet he cannot re-
trieve behavioral episodes from memory. In-
deed, R.J.’s disorder is developmental in origin,
suggesting that he has never been able to re-
trieve episodic memories.
2. Alzheimer’s dementia can damage the mech-
anisms that allow one to learn about one’s
personality traits. Yet the inability to update
personality self-knowledge need not interfere
with the ability to retrieve information from
an intact, preexisting semantic store of trait
summaries (K.R.).
3. Any dissociation between semantic domains—
whether due to brain trauma (W.J., K.C., and
D.B.), neural disease (K.R.) or autism (R.J.)—
suggests functionally isolable storage and re-
trieval systems. But finding a developmen-
tal dissociation in R.J. suggests a function-
ally isolable acquisition system. His semantic
dissociation suggests that trait self-knowledge
is acquired via learning mechanisms that are
functionally distinct from those that cause the
acquisition of knowledge about animals, ob-
jects, foods, and people.
4. Five cases—W.J., K.C., D.B., K.R., and R.J.—
show that trait self-knowledge can exist in-
dependently of episodic access and may con-
stitute a separate subsystem within semantic
memory (e.g., R.J., K.R., and D.B.).
5. Trait self-knowledge is functionally indepen-
dent of trait knowledge about other persons
(D.B., R.J., M.J.H; for the case of M.J.H.).
Implications
Our research strategy is based on the idea that one
way to determine what something is useful for is to
look at situations in which it no longer is present.33
Guided by this principle, we examined neuropsy-
chological case studies of cognitively impaired indi-
viduals to help map out the boundaries of a term—
the self—that has been imprecisely delineated in
much of psychological research.
While findings from individual case studies do
not warrant broad conclusions about the nature of
self-related function in the populations from which
individual cases have been drawn, the general con-
clusions we have proposed about the self, per se,
allow us to make some proposals and suggestions
about its nature and function in a variety of do-
mains and applications. In this section we draw out
some of the implications of our findings about the
multifaceted nature of self and apply them to re-
search domains that rely (in varying degrees) on
the concept of “self” to frame and/or interpret their
findings.
Autism
Given the multifaceted nature of self, it should
be clear that evidence of self-dysfunction in one
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aspect of autistic behavior should not automati-
cally be construed as indicative of a general fail-
ure of self in autism. For example, the finding that
autistic individuals fail to show a normal apprecia-
tion of the value of first person access to their inter-
nal states76 does not warrant a conclusion that self-
understanding in general is deviant in autism (we
are not suggesting that the authors have made this
leap; rather we are warning readers to keep in mind
that self-related findings in one context should not
automatically be assumed reflective of the self gen-
erally). Nor does the finding that autistic individuals
have been found to perform poorly on self-referent
recall tasks.77 Such findings may suggest that autism
entails deficits in organization and elaboration of
episodic recollection,78 but it is unclear what they
have to say about the cognitive structure of semantic
trait self-knowledge, per se.78,79
Moreover, the absence of a normally functioning
Theory of Mind in autism66 not necessarily license
the assumption that knowledge of one’s own mental
states will suffer equally. For example, finding that
people with autism show less empathy toward oth-
ers80 does not necessarily imply reduced empathic
knowledge of self.69,81
What is warranted is that some aspects of self-
knowledge may be impaired by an autistic disorder
while others may be intact. The self, as we have ar-
gued, is not a thing that submits to all-or-nothing
analysis. While aspects of autistic self-knowledge
can show impairment, such findings do not warrant
general conclusions about “the self in autism.”
Alzheimer’s dementia
Despite profound cognitive deficits, K.R. has intact
knowledge of her own premorbid personality and
that of her daughter. That her trait knowledge has
been preserved and remains retrievable is remark-
able given the difficulties she has retrieving ordinary
facts from semantic memory—the names of every-
day objects, what a clock looks like, where she is.
Like the other cases we have presented, K.R.’s pre-
served self-knowledge suggests a dissociation within
semantic memory, consistent with the presence of a
functionally specialized database for the storage and
retrieval of information about personality. It would
appear, however, that the computational machinery
responsible for updating personality knowledge has
been impaired in K.R. by her disease. K.R. does not
know her own current, postmorbid personality, nor
has she been able to learn the personality traits of
her primary caregiver.
Neural dissociations in other patients suggest
that personality knowledge is acquired via learn-
ing mechanisms that are specialized for that
purpose (e.g., D.B.). Individuals with profound
episodic amnesia can nevertheless update their trait
self-knowledge (e.g., K.C.). Moreover, personality
knowledge can be acquired despite developmental
disorders that impair one’s ability to acquire gen-
eral world knowledge (as well as episodic retrieval;
e.g., R.J.). By contrast, in K.R., we see a case where
trait knowledge of self and other remains intact, but
the ability to update that knowledge based on new
experiences is no longer functional.
In a related study of Alzheimer’s disease,51 we
documented a similar pattern of memory perfor-
mance for another aspect of self—one’s physical ap-
pearance. In that study, patient P.H., an 83-year-old
female in the late stages of the disease (she scores
7 on the Mini Mental State diagnostic procedure,
where a score of 22 or less is considered “definitely
abnormal” for members of her age group) was able
to recognize herself from photographs taken during
her early life (prior to age 40 years). By contrast,
pictures of her taken from age 40 onward resulted in
a far lower rate of recognition, with P.H. succeeding
on only two of 20 opportunities.
These findings, taken together with those of K.R.,
suggest that aspects of self-knowledge (i.e., person-
ality traits, facial appearance) that have been doc-
umented in clinical descriptions as degraded as a
result of Alzheimer’s disease, might degrade in such
a way as to leave vestiges of earlier representational
states. This idea is consistent with the proposal that
Alzeimer’s disease might carry with it impairment in
procedures that update various semantic databases
of self-related knowledge.40
These findings map well onto recent evidence that
Alzheimer’s dementia entails a gradual, temporally
graded loss of generic world knowledge from se-
mantic memory.82 Our results add to this litera-
ture by suggesting that this loss extends to aspects
of semantic self-knowledge as well.83 In particular,
we propose that a temporally graded breakdown in
semantic memory function can account both for
patient K.R.’s failure to update her semantic self-
knowledge on the basis of personality changes tak-
ing place because the onset of her dementia.40 (It
is, of course, a logical possibility that patient P.H.’s
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difficulties recognizing herself from pictures taken
during the last several decades of her life may submit
to a similar explanation). This conclusion has now
received support from subsequent studies replicat-
ing these findings on larger samples of Alzheimer’s
patients.84–86
Clinicians and families often characterize late-
stage Alzheimer’s patients as lacking a sense of
self.87,88 Our findings suggest a more nuanced view.
Alzheimer’s patients may be operating from knowl-
edge of a former self, which may not be congruent
with their current behavior. Clinicians and family
may need to be sensitive to the possibility that such
individuals may see themselves as they were, not as
they are.
Domain general learning
Domain-general learning theories—connectionist
or otherwise—presume that the same learning
mechanisms account for knowledge acquisition
across content domains.34 But a developmental dis-
sociation (such as that shown by R.J.) that impairs
the acquisition of knowledge about people, animals,
objects, and foods, while having little effect on the
acquisition of trait knowledge, is difficult to recon-
cile with such theories.
Such results are especially difficult for theories
positing equipotential mechanisms that compute
correlations between elementary perceptual or con-
ceptual dimensions. Surely the evidence of one’s
senses is sufficient for R.J. and others to end up
concurring that apples are sweet, lemons are not,
rocks are hard, and giraffes are tall. Yet R.J. and
others do not concur in their judgments of easily
observable properties of food, animals, and objects.
In contrast, R.J.’s judgments about his own person-
ality are consistent with those of others who know
him—even though R.J.’s judgments are those of an
autistic individual with social deficits.
Mirror self-recognition
A considerable body of research has argued that a
child’s rudimentary awareness of self first emerges
by approximately 18–24 months. The evidential ba-
sis for this conclusion is the finding that by this age
most children are able to recognize themselves in a
mirror.28,89
However, a recent study examining the ability
of a patient suffering from Prosopagnosia (an im-
pairment of face recognition following neurologi-
cal damage) to draw accurate trait inferences from
faces of persons he knows (including himself), but
fails to recognize casts doubt on the usage of face-
recognition as a means of establishing the first signs
of self-knowledge in humans.41 Although the pa-
tient, M.J.H., is not reliably greater than chance
when judging the faces of well-known others, his
trait ratings achieved considerable accuracy when
the face judged was his (despite the fact that he
could not overtly recognize that face as belonging to
him).41
This research suggests reliance on mirror self-
awareness to establish the presence of self may be ill
placed. While an ability to respond appropriately to
one’s image in a mirror may be a sufficient condition
for identification of self-awareness, it clearly is not a
necessary condition. As both the case of M.J.H. and
K.H.51 have shown, an individual may possess accu-
rate and detailed self-knowledge in the absence of
an ability to identify self via visual channels. This is
not surprising, given that the seemingly unitary self
actually may be composed of a number of different,
functionally isolable (though normally interacting)
systems.
Neuroimaging
A considerable number of recent neuroimaging
studies appear to be on a mission to locate the “self.”
But what is “the self” that neuroimagers attempt to
capture with their pictures of the brain? The results,
as the reviewers point out, thus far have been less
than encouraging.90
As we have argued in this paper, the idea that there
is a “self” to be found is based on the premise (in our
estimation, false) that there is a “self to be found.”
Rather, as we have tried to show, the self consists
in a collection of contents, aspects, and functions.
No wonder meta-analytic assessments of the suc-
cess of self-localization via imaging techniques have
been discouraging.90 Different self-related tasks ac-
tivate different aspects of the general construct, lead-
ing of necessity to a diversity of conclusions. Put
more positively, what these studies seem to be say-
ing is that the self is a multiplicity, and thus the
idea of localizing an entity called the “self” is a
nonstarter.
What ultimately is as important as the specificity
with which our imaging techniques can capture
mental/neural activity in the brain is the specificity
with which our constructs can capture the essence of
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what they are intended to describe.91 As Polanyi,92
perhaps echoing Wittgenstein, long ago warned:
“. . .either you know what you are looking for,
and then there is no problem; or you do not
know what you are looking for, and then you
cannot expect to find anything.” (p. 22).
Episodic memory and identity through time
As reported above, patient D.B. suffered a particu-
larly dense amnesia affecting his memory for per-
sonal events, which occurred both before and after
his illness. In contrast, his general knowledge and
language skills appeared relatively intact. To doc-
ument D.B.’s memory deficits, we administered a
battery of tests designed to assess both anterograde
and retrograde memory function. Testing revealed
he had profound difficulty remembering events and
experiences from his own past, but was able to pro-
vide accurate information about a number of is-
sues and events that had been in the public domain.
This pattern of selective memory impairment—a
loss of the lived past accompanied by relative spar-
ing of the known past—is consistent with a large
body of research from experimental and cognitive
neuroscience documenting dissociations between
episodic and semantic memory functioning in
amnesia.93
A novel contribution of the study of patient D.B.44
concerns the effects of his amnesia on his ability to
imagine the future. In parallel with his difficulties
remembering his personal past, D.B. had severe dif-
ficulty imagining what his experiences might be like
in the future.45,94 By contrast, his capacity to an-
ticipate issues and events in the public domain was
largely indistinguishable from that of neurologically
healthy, age-matched controls.
These findings may extend our understanding of
the relation between memory and temporal identity.
In an influential series of papers, Tulving 42,45,95 ar-
gued that episodic memory differs from other forms
of memory in that it alone enables one to relive per-
sonal events from the past and mentally project one’s
existence into the future. Tulving42,45 has coined the
term autonoesis to describe the type of awareness
accompanying episodic recollection that enables a
person to mentally travel through subjective time.
The impairment of personal temporal orientation
suffered by patient like D.B. can thus be attributed
to a disturbance in autonoetic consciousness.
While the research just reviewed might suggest
the conclusion that absent episodic memory, a sense
of self through time would be lacking or absent,
this is not necessarily the case. Our research also
suggests that semantic memory makes possible a
form of mental time travel, albeit one that does not
entail awareness of the temporal dimension of one’s
own experience. Specifically, D.B., who does possess
semantic memory, is capable of knowing about, but
not re-experiencing, previous states of the world
and drawing on that generic knowledge to construct
possible impersonal scenarios of the future. Thus, he
may be able to infer his placement in a chronology of
events without simultaneously being able to call up
distinct, personal imagery of himself in that past and
future.
It thus would seem that the ability to mentally
travel back and forth in time is not wedded to a par-
ticular form of memorial experience; rather, there
appear to be qualitatively different types of tem-
poral experience associated with different forms of
memory. It is the episodic variant, which appears
primarily related to what might best be termed tem-
poral personal identity. This is consistent with find-
ings of identity loss accompanying episodic amne-
sia in dissociative identity disorders such as Fugue
states.96
Conclusions
The case studies we have summarized add to a
growing body of evidence demonstrating that some
components of the self can be selectively spared
while others are profoundly damaged.18,28,37,42,72,97
Across these cases, trait self-knowledge has been
preserved in the face of impairments to episodic
retrieval,18 personal temporality,44 general world
knowledge,40,72 and the meta-representational skills
that allow self-reflection.40,49
In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
documented cases in which a person has lost trait
self-knowledge while retaining other components
of the self. Of the systems of self we have exam-
ined, the semantic self-knowledge system seems the
most resilient in the face of the cognitive chaos re-
sulting from developmental and/or environmental
damage to the brain. This is both an empirical fact
and a mystery for which we have, at present, no
explanation.
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Final thoughts
At its most general level, our point is this. To
understand what it means, cognitively, to have a
“self,” divide and conquer may be the best re-
search strategy, and the fractionation provided by
neuropsychological data may provide a particularly
useful database. Although the corpus of relevant
neuropsychological cases is still small, it already sug-
gests that “the self” is actually composed of a num-
ber of functionally independent systems.28,29,34,90
These include, but are not limited to: (a) semantic
representations of one’s own personality traits, (b)
episodic memories of one’s own life, (c) knowledge
of facts about one’s own life, (d) a sense of personal
agency and ownership, (e) the ability to self-reflect,
(f) the experience of continuity of personal identity
through time, and (g) ability to recognize represen-
tations of self (e.g., in mirrors, photographs).
By developing a careful model of each, one can
eventually put the pieces together. Detailed, com-
putationally explicit models of each piece will al-
low one to discover which components actually are
the outputs of a single mechanism; when one com-
ponent of the self requires another component to
operate properly, without being reducible to that
component; and when two (or more) components
of the self coexist and jointly contribute to men-
tal life, without requiring one another to operate.
Paradoxically, a research strategy that assumes the
self is divided may be the fastest way to learn how
the parts come together to create the experience
of unity derived from our knowledge of self by
acquaintance.
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